
Transcript of the Inquests

Date: 21st June 2022

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Ms Gilliam BOAG-MUNROE	Sworn	4
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CORONER: Can I just ask, please? You know we are having transcripts prepared. The company who are doing the transcription service have apparently reported back that people’s voices are quite faint. So can you all please make an effort to keep your microphones right close to you and keep your voices up please, because otherwise there is going to be a problem as far as the transcription is concerned? Thank you.

Mr SANDERS, I think you have got, is it four live witnesses today?

MR SANDERS QC: No, sir. It is three ...

CORONER: Three.

MR SANDERS QC: ... live witnesses. And so what we are proposing to do is to hear
Dr BOAG-MUNROE first.

CORONER: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: She is here in court. We would have then heard Mrs HUNT next, but
she is down on the south coast and has been given a marker to arrive
by 12 o'clock.

CORONER: I see. All right.

MR SANDERS QC: So it might be that we hear from Dr BOAG-MUNROE, read
Mrs WESTON-DAVIES' statement, and then hear from Colonel
INNES.

CORONER: Right.

MR SANDERS QC: It depends on the timing ...

CORONER: Yes, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... but we might do it that way.

CORONER: Well, we will just play it by ear ...

MR SANDERS QC: Yes.

CORONER: ... and see how it goes. Good. Well then, thank you very much.

MR SANDERS QC: So if I could start by calling Dr Gill BOAG-MUNROE.

DR GILLIAN BOAG-MUNROE (sworn)

CORONER: Thank you very much. Please sit down, please. Would you give me your full name, please?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Gillian BOAG-MUNROE.

CORONER: Thank you very much. And you have a nice loud clear voice, so that is going to be excellent. Thank you very much.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Lots of teaching.

CORONER: I will pass you over please to Mr SANDERS.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you, sir. I can see that the screen by Dr BOAG-MUNROE isn't on.

CLERK: (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: I am not sure if we'll need it, but just in case. Thank you. I understand you go by Doctor rather than Lieutenant nowadays?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Oh, I haven't been Lieutenant for many years.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. If you could just look at the screen, and I'm going to ask Mrs NIN to put up your statement. It's at 10-2 on Caselines. I think you've got a hard copy with you ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I have.

MR SANDERS QC: ... in any event. There's your witness statement there. Could you just please just, you've already confirmed your full name, but you live near Cleveland in the North East.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I live in North Yorkshire, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And just looking at this statement, which is, I think, seven pages, or six pages long. Is that your signature at the end dated the 13th April?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

It is.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And can you confirm that the contents are true?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

That my?

MR SANDERS QC: That the contents are true?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

To the best of my knowledge they are.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And at the time of the Guildford Pub Bombing your maiden name was TAYLOR. Is that correct?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. So you are now retired.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And at the time of the Guildford Pub Bombing in 1974 you say in your statement you were aged 24 and you were a Second Lieutenant in the Women's Royal Army Corps?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: That we are going to refer to as the WRAC.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

No, never.

MR SANDERS QC: No?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

No, never ever. W R A C, please.

MR SANDERS QC: WRAC, very well. Good job you weren't here yesterday. And you were a Platoon Commander?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And your platoon included Ann HAMILTON and Caroline SLATER ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... who both sadly died in the bombing. Could you help first with just an outline of your career in the military?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I was in the OTC at university, and then I did a short (inaudible) directly with the Commission, with the WRAC, and then went on to become a regular officer. After leaving Guildford, I went to Camberley to do some further training, and was then posted to the Junior Leaders Regiment of the Royal Artillery in Nuneaton, with the rank of Captain, where I was the Training Adjutant. And after two years there I went to HQ RA (inaudible) as a Staff Officer, and after 18 months there I resigned.

MR SANDERS QC: And so how long was your period in the Army?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Five years.

MR SANDERS QC: Five years. And then that was the end of your military career and you went on to do other things?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. Could you just help us with an outline of the WRAC's position within the British Army and what its role was and what its members did?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

The role of the Women's Royal Army Corps was to support men in their fighting role. We took over, in the event of war, we took over their administrative work so that they could go and fight. We were not a fighting unit.

MR SANDERS QC: And the WRAC, I think you say, was established just after the Second World War?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And it's no longer in existence in the form it was?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I believe not.

MR SANDERS QC: And the Headquarters were at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks. Is that correct?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And that's, it is two miles from Guildford High Street?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I couldn't remember that. It's not something that stays in my memory.

MR SANDERS QC: No. But do you remember the nearest town was Guildford, the ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Of course, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... nearest town centre? Yes, thank you. So the Queen Elizabeth Barracks, as I understand it, and correct me I'm wrong, was the starting point for all of the other ranks, so the non-officers, within the WRAC? That was where they went for their basic training?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And you say, "There were two training companies and each comprised four platoons."

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And you were a Platoon Commander. So you were sort of the lower level of the officers?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I was the bottom rung of the officers, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Bottom rung. Thank you. So the camp itself was quite a large establishment.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Lots of members of the WRAC there.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Did the Queen Elizabeth Barracks serve any other purpose apart from

basic training for new recruits?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

It was also a holding company for sometimes officers and sometimes other ranks who were in transition. Perhaps moving to another unit, but there wasn't space for them in that unit yet or, as I myself did, I went back there just before I resigned, just as I resigned from the Army.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And you say that you answer to a Company Commander,

so one of the two training companies, the Commander of that was effectively your boss?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And that you remember Captain Rosemary but you can't remember the

...?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I think it might have been WADIE (?), but I'm not too sure.

MR SANDERS QC: I don't know if this helps. Just from the statements gathered at the time, and this isn't comprehensive research, we have found the name of a Major Patricia INESEN.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes, I remember Pat INESEN very well.

MR SANDERS QC: And she would have been above the ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes, she was.

MR SANDERS QC: ... the Company Commanders? And then we have a Captain Rona BURNS and a Captain Elsie EDWARDS. They don't ring any bells to you?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

No.

MR SANDERS QC: Don't suppose it matters, but ... And so each platoon, so as a platoon head it had someone in your position, a Lieutenant or a Second Lieutenant ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... in charge, and then supported by a Sergeant and a Corporal?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And then 30 trainee recruits ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... approximately? And so if there were two training companies of four platoons, that's ... Is that 120 recruits at any one time?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And was it a rolling programme of training courses? So did you have sort of an intake every six weeks, or did you have, do a course and then a gap and then another course?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Six weeks of training, a week off, and then a further six weeks of training, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: So you would have seen a lot of new recruits coming through ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... even in the short time you were there?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And so it was, you describe in your statement it was induction type introduction to the Army and to military life training?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And so what age were the recruits?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

They were mostly 18, 19, 20. Occasionally they were slightly older, in their later 20s, but most of them were late teens. Over 18, because they had to be. 18, 19, 20 ish.

MR SANDERS QC: And would they have been school leavers or would they have worked before joining up?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

A mix of both.

MR SANDERS QC: And then once they'd completed the six weeks at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, they would then go off to specialise in particular trades?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And so what jobs would they go on to do?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

They could do secretarial work, driving, stewarding, clerical work, a very rare few became PTIs, Physical Training Instructors. I can't remember any other jobs.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. It was a residential course. They lived on the camp?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And what was the breakdown as between when they were on duty and off duty?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I don't think we were ever off duty during training. It varied. In the first three weeks it was slightly easier. They would finish at about 5 o'clock. Quite often though, in the second three weeks, we finished much later, anything up to about 9 or 10 o'clock, depending on what it was we were required to do. But they didn't get a great deal of free time, neither did we.

MR SANDERS QC: And can you remember what the difference between the first three weeks and the second three weeks was in terms of what was being covered on the course?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I don't remember a huge difference, except that in the first three weeks, while the recruits were doing basic drill, learning drill, the officers didn't join on parade. But during the second three weeks we did, and there was a lot of rehearsal for the Passing Out Parade. But in terms of content, it was ... I really can't remember.

MR SANDERS QC: And do we take it it was a mix of some classroom based training and then some, there was a reference yesterday to square bashing, and also PE type activities?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

We did a lot of drill, yes, and plus classroom work and PE.

MR SANDERS QC: And when the recruits were off duty, what was their freedom of movement? Could they leave the camp or did they have to stay there or how did that work?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

My recollection, and it's a hazy recollection, but my recollection is that in the first three weeks they didn't go off camp so that they could adjust to life in the barracks. So their social life would have revolved around the NAAFI. In the second three weeks they could go off camp, and I have a feeling that the Guildford bomb happened either at the end of the third week or the end of the fourth week of training.

MR SANDERS QC: That's correct. So it was the, I think that your recruits had started on Monday 16th September, and then it was the third Saturday after that that it happened. One oddity, and you may not be able to help with this. But Carol BURNS in her statement gives quite a lot of detail about them having been into Guildford and been to various pubs several times before the night of the bombing, and sort of had already

become regulars at the Horse & Groom by the time of the bombing.

So how does that fit with the three weeks staying on camp and them having obviously, or her evidence was they ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I'm happy to accept that that's my faulty memory.

MR SANDERS QC: ... went in ...? Okay, very well. Thank you. And what were the rules, if any, about the recruits drinking either in the NAAFI or when they went into the town? Were they free to do that or were there any rules about that?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

As far as I recall, they were free to do that as long as they didn't return to barracks unduly drunk.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You say in your statement in relation to security and what the recruits were told about security that, "We all lived and breathed security."

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Now, could you just elaborate on what you mean by that?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Within the barracks there was no sense of insecurity. Outside the barracks we were very aware that the IRA had a fondness for planting

car bombs and for sending letter bombs. And so we were instructed to check the underside of our car before going out for anything that looked suspicious. And my memory is that the Guardhouse checked all mail that came in, so that when it got to the relevant mess we could be sure that there was nothing suspicious there.

MR SANDERS QC: And was the main security concern at the time the IRA and activities of the IRA?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And so would the recruits be given not necessarily training, but told about the threat and being vigilant and so on?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You talk about the process for disseminating information, and you tell us about Part I and Part II Orders.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Could you explain first what a Part I Order was, to the best of your recollection?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Apologies, Colonel INNES, this might be one for you. I can't remember which way around it is. One of them is the Daily Instruction Sheet, and the other is the Standing Instruction Sheet. The Daily Instruction Sheet would have had details of all the events that were going to occur that day, together with any instructions to any particular people on camp who had to do various things, such as meeting with the Camp Commandant or something like that. The other orders, the Standing Orders, would be the ones that contained policy and security information.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And how are they disseminated or promulgated, the orders?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

They are posted prominently in every single barrack room, in the Officers' Mess and the Sergeants' Mess, and we were expected, recruits were told that they must, to read the orders every single day.

MR SANDERS QC: And would either the Standing Orders or the Daily Orders contain information about security or threats ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... or anything? Yes. Can you remember what sort of information it would be? Just reminders or more specific?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I can't be more specific, I'm afraid.

MR SANDERS QC: No, that's fine. Thank you. You say in your statement you've no memory of anything along the lines of posters warning generally about the IRA, or specific training about the IRA or threats it might propose. Do you remember anything about the BIKINI Alert State?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Not at that time, no.

MR SANDERS QC: No. Is that something you have in your mind from a later part of ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... your career? Oh, so when did you come across it? Do you remember?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

50 years ago. I can't give you a date, I'm sorry.

MR SANDERS QC: No, no. So do you have any recollection of ... At the Gatehouse, when the recruits went out into the town, was there anything saying, "This is the alert level," or, "This is a reminder about security," or anything along those lines?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I can't recall anything like that, no.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You mention that the recruits were instructed not to wear their uniforms ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... when they went out. What was the rationale, the reason for that?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

The idea was that we shouldn't be immediately identifiable as military personnel, because clearly the IRA could then spot us and target us.

That, as far as I'm aware, was the sole rationale. It was for being non-identifiable.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And you say that to a certain extent you would be identifiable anyway ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... because you looked like members of the WRA ...?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

WRAC, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ...WRAC, near the Queen Elizabeth Barracks or in Guildford?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And then there were obviously, if the girls were meeting up with soldiers from the nearby camps, those soldiers would also look like squaddies?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Oh, yes, definitely.

MR SANDERS QC: I think you say you avoided going to pubs in Guildford.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: What was the reason for that?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

It is traditional that officers and other ranks don't socialise together, because we both need our private spaces, and it's unlikely that we would appreciate the same kind of environment as well. So we tended to go, the officers tended to go quite a way outside of Guildford if they wanted to go to a pub or a restaurant or something like that.

MR SANDERS QC: So it wasn't that, just to be clear, there was no fear that there was going to be a bomb in a Guildford pub and that's why you weren't going to ...?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

No.

MR SANDERS QC: No. Thank you. Was there any kind of general exercising of caution or vigilance in connection with recruits going into town or going to pubs, or was that something that they were advised to be particularly careful about, or ...?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I cannot remember ever advising recruits on that, but the NCOs might have done that.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. Were you aware that there had been an IRA attack at the Pirbright Camp the year before in 1973? Was that something you were aware of?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I can't remember it. I was doing finals at university at that time and not much went in other than law.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. We are going to read out later on in the inquest proceedings a statement you made at the time, because you identified the bodies of Ann ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

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MR SANDERS QC: ... and Caroline. Where were you on the evening of Saturday 5th October, the night of the bombings?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I can't remember exactly where I was, but an old friend and I had gone out to a pub some way from Guildford, because my birthday is the 2nd October. We'd gone out to have a celebratory drink. I remember driving back along the dual carriageway, encountering an AA man who was in a panic, being told that there'd been a bomb in Guildford and that we couldn't continue. And my friend said, "She's an officer there. She's got to go through," and so I came back to barracks that way.

MR SANDERS QC: And as well as obviously losing Ann and Caroline, a great many of the recruits were injured?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And it seems that there were quite a number of members of your platoon in the pub at the time in particular?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

It was nearly all of my platoon was in that pub, yes. They were celebrating Carol BURNS' birthday.

MR SANDERS QC: And what was the impact of the bombing on the WRAC at the time and thereafter?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

We were all in shock. The girls in my platoon, and the others I suspect, were deeply distressed. And what made it a great deal worse was that some clowns thought that it was fun to keep ringing the Guardhouse and saying there was a bomb scare in the middle of the night, so that we had to get up and muster until the all clear was given.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And do you remember if there was any, obviously in the subsequent intakes of recruits, was there any change in the training or advice that they were given about security and about the threat?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I can't recall any specific advice that was given, but I do know that we'd anticipated a drop in numbers, which actually didn't happen.

MR SANDERS QC: And was there a change in the practice in terms of girls going into the town to socialise? Did they tend to stay on the camp after that, or did that not change?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

That's not something I can recall. I'm sorry.

MR SANDERS QC: We have seen sort of contemporaneous media reports showing pubs in Guildford putting signs up saying, "No service personnel."

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DR BOAG-MUNROE:

That sounds right.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. I don't have any further questions. That has been very helpful. Thank you. It may be that there are some other questions from either the learned Coroner or the other counsel.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Thank you.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you.

CORONER: Doctor, could I just ask you? You said earlier in your evidence that, albeit I think you went on later to say that you do not recall personally giving advice over vigilance, but there was, at a stage you said, "Troops were told to be vigilant."

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

CORONER: What did you mean by that?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

I think what I probably meant was that between the officers and the NCOs, where we were talking to girls as they were going to socialise, we probably said, you know, "Keep your eyes open for anything suspicious." But I honestly have no memory of any specific words or phrases or sessions that we taught on that.

CORONER: You said that you as a Junior Officer would not go into Guildford, to any of the pubs in Guildford ...

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

CORONER: ... for reasons that you have explained that were not related to threats and violence. It was tradition (inaudible).

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Purely a tradition, yes.

CORONER: It is right though, is it not, that there were pubs in Guildford that were known to be frequented by soldiers, whether they be from one of your platoons or one of the platoons in (inaudible)?

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Yes.

CORONER: Thank you. Ms BARTON?

MS BARTON QC: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Mr BERRY?

MR BERRY: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Mr PLEETH?

MR PLEETH: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Thank you. Mr SANDERS, anything else from you?

MR SANDERS QC: No, thank you, sir. No.

CORONER: Thank you very much. That concludes your evidence. I am very grateful to you. You are free to stay or to go as you choose.

DR BOAG-MUNROE:

Thank you very much.

(Witness withdrew)

MR SANDERS: Sir, thank you. I am going to hand over to Ms KUZMENKO to read the statement of Julia WESTON-DAVIES.

MS KUZMENKO: The statement for Julia WESTON-DAVIES starts as follows.

CORONER: Sorry, can we just have the reference for the court?

MS KUZMENKO: My apologies. S9-80.

CORONER: Which is Caselines 10-13, I think. Is that right?

MS KUZMENKO: Just getting up my other document.

CORONER: (inaudible).

MS KUZMENKO: That's the one I'm trying to get.

UK FEMALE: 10-13.

MS KUZMENKO: Is it? Thank you. Yes, 10-13. Thank you.

MS KUZMENKO: (Statements of Julia WESTON-DAVIES read in full)

"I joined the WRAC on the 4th February 1973, and I have been stationed at Guildford since April 2nd 1973. At 9 am on Saturday 5th October, I commenced duty at the camp. At about 9.15 pm the same day I was informed of an explosion at a public house in Guildford. I was aware that several of our girls were in Guildford, and we wanted to find out if they were involved. So I went with

Captain EDWARDS to the Royal Surrey Hospital. When we arrived at the hospital we were able to establish that some of our girls had been admitted, but we were unable to give assistance so we left. We arrived back at camp at about 9.45 pm the same evening.” And that’s signed and dated the 9th October 1974. We then have an addendum statement at S90A.

CORONER: **That is 10-14.**

MS KUZMENKO: 10-14. Thank you.

“I am currently retired. On the day of the Guildford Pub Bombings, 5th October 1974, I was 24 years old and was a Lieutenant in the Women’s Royal Army Corps (WRAC), stationed at Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Guildford, Surrey. I have made the statement with the assistance of Junior Counsel to the Inquest, Matthew FLINN, pursuant to an exchange of emails and telephone calls. Except where I indicate to the contrary, facts and matters contained in this witness statement are within my own knowledge. Where the facts are not within my own knowledge, I have identified my sources of information or belief. Where I refer to information supplied by others, the source of that information is identified. Facts and matters derived from other sources are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I went to the University of Reading and graduated with a Degree in History in 1971. I then joined the Women's Royal Army Corps (WRAC) in early 1972, and completed a short training course at the WRAC School of Instruction, Camberley, before being posted to the Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Guildford. I have been provided with a copy of a statement I provided to Surrey Police on the 9th October 1974, and see that the date I joined the WRAC was the 4th February 1973, before commencing my duties in Guildford on the 2nd April 1973. That seems about right.

“Initially, I held the rank of Second Lieutenant and was a Platoon Commander. After about a year, I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. At around that time I met Wynne WESTON-DAVIES through my brother, who was at that time married to the sister of Wynne's sister-in-law, and we married in 1974. That meant that I spent longer than usual at QEB than many others, as Wynne's work as a Surgeon was based in Guildford, and I think efforts were made to avoid posting me away from him. I spent about five years at QEB doing various jobs, eventually being promoted to Captain, before leaving in 1978. I was then posted to 10 Signals Regiment at Beavers Lane Camp in Hounslow. I spent about 20 months there. My next posting was to Lansdowne House in Berkeley Square, where I worked

in the Department of Army Recruiting. I left the Army in 1984. I then undertook a Degree in Art History, and worked as a Guide Lecturer at the Tate Gallery and the Wallis Collection.

“In the 1970s almost all women who wished to join the Army joined the WRAC. Very few trainees were cap-badged directly out to a regiment or corps. QEB was a WRAC training depot for female recruits. It had two training companies, First Company and Second Company, and a Headquarters Company. I think each training company had about 100 girls, and there were about 30 to 40 officers at the depot. In those days women in the Army were not combatants, but were recruited to take on roles, such as Cooks, Drivers and Telephonists. As such, there was little convention or military training at QEB beyond being taught how to march and salute. I remember that the barracks had a large parade ground and a lot of sports facilities. The training course was quite basic and lasted about 12 weeks. At the end of training recruits would pass out and be posted on to another depot or unit.

“I no longer have a detailed recollection of the events of the 5th October 1974. I see that in my statement of the 9th October 1974, I started my duties at 9 am. I cannot remember what I did during the day. I would have finished my day duties at about 5 or 6 pm. I do remember that I

was on call as the Orderly Officer that night, a role which I had to do once every three weeks or so. Work as the on call Orderly Officer began after the day duties ended. You would meet up with the Orderly Sergeant and do tasks such as walk the perimeter fence of the barracks to check it was secure, and wait by the telephone to deal with any calls that came in concerning any of the recruits, such as reports of accidents or girls getting into trouble.

“I see from my earlier statement that about 9 pm that night I was informed about an explosion at a public house in Guildford. I can remember that this notification came in via a telephone call, but I’m afraid I can’t remember anything more about it after all this time, such as where I was or what else I was told. I also said in my statement that I travelled with Captain EDWARDS to Royal Surrey Hospital. I’m afraid I have no independent recollection of this either. I do have a recollection of travelling somewhere, presumably the hospital with Captain EDWARDS, and the part of Guildford that we travelled through all seemed quiet. We didn’t see any ambulances, police cars or fire engines. This may be because we didn’t go through the town centre.

“I also remember that when we got back to QEB girls were starting to return from their evenings out. We opened up the Adjutants Block

and the phones started ringing with calls from concerned parents and the like. However, most of the activity from my perspective happened the following day, the Sunday. On that day a number of police officers, and male Army officers from Aldershot, came over to help us and manage the response to the incident. I remember receiving one call from the mother of one of the girls who was unaccounted for. I know it was one of those who died, but I can't recall the name. I handed over the phone to a male Army officer who was nearby, as they were more experienced in handling that kind of matter.

"I don't have very clear recollections of the way security was managed at QEB. As I have mentioned, the site had a perimeter fence, which I think curved outward at the top to keep people out. There was also a security barrier at the entrance gate and a guard room. You couldn't just come and go as you pleased. Everyone based at the camp had an ID card, which they had to show in order to enter. It was nothing like a prison facility, however. I wasn't involved in providing training or seminars on security. I think this would have been done by officers of a higher rank, such as Captains or Majors. However, I do recall delivering talks about other topics, such as the Geneva Convention and the history of the Corps, and in the course of those talks the

questions asked might lead on to discussions about security related issues.

“In terms of the security culture or measures in place, I recall that the girls were told not to go out alone, and were never ever permitted to go out in uniform. They were also told that if they were writing to someone, they should not put their rank, or the recipient’s rank, on the letter. More generally, recruits were just made to keep their eyes open and be careful.

“I can’t remember if recruits were given advice about avoiding any particular locations in or around Guildford. I think some of the locations in town were seen unofficially as being out of bounds, but that was more because they were known to be places where drunken behaviour or punch ups could occur, rather than because of a terrorist threat. To my recollection, in that sense, the Horse & Groom Public House was not perceived by officers as being the greatest place, but it was known as being popular with junior service personnel. In any event, recruits were not restricted from visiting there, or any particular locations, as far as I can recall. Nor were there any occasions when they were locked down or prevented from leaving the camp, unless that happened for a short period after the bombings in Guildford in

1974. I cannot now recall. I don't think we had a policy or procedure which provided for that kind of measure.

"I have been asked if I recall anything about Part I or Part II Orders.

To my recollection, Part I Orders contained general information about life in the services, including any pertinent information about security.

I think they were typed up each Friday and posted on notice boards around QEB. In terms of security, I can't remember specifics, but I think they would have contained reminders about looking out for suspicious persons or items of luggage. Part II Orders were more administrative documents containing notifications of postings and promotions.

"I have been asked if I am familiar with the BIKINI Alert System, and recall the terms BIKINI Red, BIKINI Amber and BIKINI Black Special. These terms are familiar to me, but I could not tell you what each term meant or what it involved in practice. I suspect that any alert level would have been set out on the Part I Orders, as in those days there weren't many other methods for disseminating information widely." That's then signed with a statement of truth on the 25th May 2022. Thank you, sir.

CORONER: Thank you very much.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you, sir. And if we could now call Colonel INNES.

CORONER: Thank you.

LT COL SCOTT ALEXANDER INNES (sworn)

CORONER: Thank you very much. Do sit down, please.

LT COL INNES: Thank you, sir.

CORONER: Colonel, would you give me your full name, please?

LT COL INNES: It is Scott Alexander INNES.

CORONER: Thank you very much. And, as with others, you have got a nice loud voice. Just please make sure you keep it loud so we get your recording accurately. Mr SANDERS.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you, sir. Good morning, Colonel. Can I just please take you to your statement? Which if we can get it on the screen next to you. It's at ...

LT COL INNES: May I refer to my hardcopy?

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, absolutely. Just for everyone else's benefit, I'll give the Caselines reference as well. It is 10-65. And so it is headed, "Witness statement of Lieutenant Colonel Scott Alexander INNES," and it runs for 12 pages. And then down on the final page signed by you on 7th June 2022. Do you see that?

LT COL INNES: I see that. That's my signature.

MR SANDERS QC: And can you confirm the contents of the statement are true?

LT COL INNES: I can confirm the contents, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. Could we start please with your current post, your current role?

LT COL INNES: My appointment is the Staff Officer Grade 1 Security for Headquarters Regional Command. What that means is I'm the Principal Staff Officer responsible to the General Officer commanding Regional Command for the delivery of (inaudible) security. The (inaudible) is defined as the essential enduring support that is required to enable the Army to live, work and operate in any area where it is currently based.

MR SANDERS QC: And when you refer to Regional Commander, is that a particular region or is that a particular level of the Army?

LT COL INNES: So, like we have two structures within the Army. The operational structure. If we think of Army Headquarters at the top level, the operational side goes down to Field Army, and then the Fighting Divisions in simple terms. The other side goes down through Headquarters Home Command and into Regional Command. Regional Command is essentially managed by a Two-Star General who is responsible for all aspects of (inaudible) based support; what is essential for living, working and operating, and that's at Headquarters at (inaudible), and is responsible throughout the UK and overseas wherever they are permanently based.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And you have been in the Army, I think, for 37 years. You joined in 1985. Without going blow by blow through all those decades, could you just give us an outline of what you've done in your career?

LT COL INNES: Very simple. I joined the Army at aged 16 as a Junior Leader, and I (inaudible) to the Military Police. So I conducted my training in 1986, but then subsequently served through the ranks up to (inaudible) Class 1. And I commissioned (?) in 2006, and I've served since in various Military Police command appointments, both at regimental and at grade level (?) and other staff appointments. I was selected for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in December 20, and I assumed my current appointment in March 2021.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. What you've dealt with in your statement is, the topic is, "The responsibilities of Army Commanders for personnel based in England in 1974," and you've made clear in your statement that you are able to deal with what should in theory have been happening, but can't speak directly to what was in practice happening on the ground in and around Guildford. Is that correct?

LT COL INNES: That's correct. I have no knowledge of the facts at that time, and have been reliant on the documentary evidence that has been available.

MR SANDERS QC: And as well as relying on the documents, you've also relied to some extent on your experience as someone who has served in the Army for 30 odd years?

LT COL INNES: I am, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. We don't need to go through the details, but you refer in the statement to an extensive search for relevant documents amongst MoD and Army records, and to the fact that very few documents survive from that period. Is that correct?

LT COL INNES: That's correct, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And you say that probably about less than 5% of the documents from 1974 are still in existence?

LT COL INNES: 5%, as speculated by one of my colleagues, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You've referred to some existing policy documents about the BIKINI Alert System, and you also mention Part I and Part II Orders and Standing Orders. Could you just explain what the different types of orders are and what they would have been at the time?

LT COL INNES: Yes. The term Part I and Part II Orders is no longer extant. We have just routine orders in turn. And that's in accordance with Queen's Regulations 1975. However, I am familiar from the early stage of my career of Part I and Part II. I think in essence the routine orders that

we have now, that we have one form of orders. So they would be published weekly, they are now, generally on a Thursday in most units. Some units can have them daily. Those units, particularly if they have people on duty. So the orders would publish the names who you are going to have on (inaudible) duty, or for myself, as a Military Police Officer, who is therefore on day and on night shift. Additionally, there would be, if there was a change of policy, there would be notification of that policy on the orders, prior to being embedded in (inaudible) Policy or the (inaudible) Policy. But in general, if there is anything that a service person needs to be aware of, and indeed needed to action.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You've also, in terms of surviving materials, provided copies of the Manual of Army Security. Would that have been the bible for security within the Army at the time? Would that be the main reference source?

LT COL INNES: It would be the primary policy for security, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And we see that there was a Volume 1 that dealt with principles, that was 1969, and then there was a Volume 2 which came in two parts, and we have Part I from 1971, which was about Minimum Standards, and then Part II the version we have is from

1977. So we are not sure what it would have looked like in 1974, but that dealt with physical measures.

LT COL INNES: That's correct, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: I just want to take you to paragraph 9 of your statement please, where you quote from Volume 1 of the manual. And you say, so the quote from the manual is, "Security in the Army is a normal part of command administration. It is based upon all ranks being aware of their personal responsibility for security. This means the establishment of the following essential requirements; A) All ranks must appreciate that the threat to security exists and understand its nature; B) Commanders at all levels are responsible for security within their commands. Their informed interest improves the general state of security faster and more durably than anything else."

And then continues on from there, a later paragraph, "The means used to meet and defeat the threat from hostile intelligence and subversive activities form two functions; security intelligence and protective security." So that's the basic statement of the principle. Can you help with what's meant by those two functions; security intelligence on the one hand and protective security on the other?

LT COL INNES: I think security intelligence very much what or how it is defined, and it's the method (inaudible). So, to put that in context, (inaudible) we

receive information on security threats, or information will be changed, the particular threat and the particular area. That will come from Army Headquarters, where the Principal Security Advisor sends.

There's then a network of (inaudible) underneath myself, down to (inaudible), and that information could be passed down. So it enables our Commanding Officer, or what we term now as the Head of the Establishment, to review any security measures that are in place, and to take any (inaudible) actual actions accordingly.

With protective security, again as it is outlined further in my statement, you have the Unit Security Officer, who is now classed as an Establishment Security Officer. And they are responsible, on behalf of the Commanding Officer, to conduct the security assessment. That's the threat, (inaudible) of the location, of where the (inaudible) is in the establishment, and indeed the minor security in the local area, to ensure that there are protective measures put in place.

And that's physical measures in place, the security layers within the camp, or indeed any measures which might protect people that live in the camp. But that will be then formalised in the Security Instructions and the Security Policy.

In addition to that, again as I alluded in my statement, is a requirement for training, and training again makes individuals aware of the

security threat, and particularly a local security threat. And that's what I see between security and intelligence. It is intelligence that is passed down and enables the Head of Establishment, the Commanding Officer, to be as informed as he can to be able then to make the correct decisions to ensure the security for the establishment and for the people (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. So security intelligence is about assessing the threat, and protective security is about dealing with and managing the threat?

LT COL INNES: Correct, yes. (inaudible) now.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. I'd just like to take you to ... You refer to a diagram, and we have it at 11-60 in Caselines, if I can view that.

UK FEMALE: 6 0?

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, 6 0.

UK MALE: What page number, please?

MR SANDERS QC: It is 11-6 0. So if you could just scroll up. That's it. So paragraph one is, "Army Security can be shown diagrammatically as follows. Army Security." And so we have the two sides; security intelligence on the right, which has a dotted line down to investigation, so that's the assessment of the threat, and then most of it is to do with protective security measures once the threat has been assessed. And the types of measures are legal powers, orders and instructions, security education

and training, physical security, personnel security, inspections and checks and investigation. And security education and training, which I mention there is obviously, there's two limbs to that. Are you able to help with the difference between training and education?

LT COL INNES: Difficult to understand what the context would specifically be in here. But education and training (inaudible) now is educated early information. Training is to confirm the understanding.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. You mention in your statement the BIKINI Alert System, which was in place in the early 70s, and was still in place into the Noughties, into the 21st Century, I think ...

LT COL INNES: 2006 I think they changed it.

MR SANDERS QC: But is not in place any more. Firstly, do you know if BIKINI was an acronym or just a word that was chosen, a label for the system?

LT COL INNES: I've no factual knowledge. If you Google it on the internet it says it was computer randomly selected. But, other than that, I've got no understanding.

MR SANDERS QC: And what were the alert levels within the BIKINI System?

LT COL INNES: (inaudible). BIKINI Black, BIKINI Black Special, BIKINI Amber and BIKINI Red.

MR SANDERS QC: And in your statement, I think paragraph 13, you describe what the definition of each of those levels were. Could you just outline that for us, please?

LT COL INNES: Certainly. BIKINI Black, this is the norm. It is assessed that there is a possibility of terrorist activity with no defined target or time of attack. The minimum alert state to be applied on domestic and international terrorist organisations are assessed as a potential threat in Great Britain, or have a capacity to revert to operations during a period of ceasefire.

BIKINI Black Special. Information has been received and it is assessed that there is an increased likelihood of terrorist activity with no defined target or time. This alert state would normally be applied when the assessment indicates an increased threat that does not justify adopting BIKINI Amber. It may also be applied as a precautionary measure for short periods to cover events liable to stimulate terrorist action. A date for review of one month will be set at the time of the rise to Black Special.

BIKINI Amber. Specific information has been received and it is assessed that there is a substantial threat to government targets within a specified period of time. This alert state could be adopted as a general or local warning, and would normally be applied for a limited

period only. The day for review will be set at the time of rise to BIKINI Amber.

And finally BIKINI Red. A specific threat or other definite information indicates that an imminent terrorist attack against a particular government target, or in a particular area, can be expected, or an object suspected to be a bomb has been found. This alert state would normally only be applied as a local warning and for a limited period.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. If one does do some internet research into the system, there's some reference to a lower level of BIKINI White. Is that familiar to you, or is that something you are unable to help with?

LT COL INNES: I'm not familiar with it.

MR SANDERS QC: And so BIKINI Black was effectively the default. So that there's no specific threat, but there's just a general level of awareness.

LT COL INNES: Correct. Possibility of terrorist activity.

MR SANDERS QC: And Black Special would be something you would only go into on a temporary basis while there was an increased threat assessment?

LT COL INNES: It would be reviewed. So, as you say, a temporary basis. I mean it doesn't apply now. So (inaudible) it can be applied as precautionary for a short period (inaudible). I think the key point is when it's live it is reviewed (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: Certainly in the late 90s, from my experience of going to military camps and government buildings, you'd see in the reception or the guardhouse a sign saying what the alert level was. It would normally be Black or Black Special. Was that part of the system, that there would be reminder for those coming into and leaving the camp as to what the alert would be?

LT COL INNES: I'm aware the alert status, from my own experience, was always posted at any camp point where I would exit. I'm not (inaudible) corresponding reference within policy, so I'm unfamiliar with where we set that guidance or the direction to do that.

MR SANDERS QC: You say in your statement that Operational Commanders were responsible for setting the level for their establishment or establishments. What level is an Operational Commander?

LT COL INNES: Well, firstly the correct level was set nationally, but a local Commander could be down to a Head of Establishment, a Commanding Officer, who is responsible for that site. If they had other information then they could take certain specific deterrent measures for the allocation in order to protect their people.

MR SANDERS QC: But would they be able to increase the alert above the national level?

LT COL INNES: It would be the measures that they would take, not necessarily increasing the alert (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you.

LT COL INNES: So it is additional protective measures they would put in place.

MR SANDERS QC: And they would do that by reference to what intelligence they had about what was going on around and so on?

LT COL INNES: Yes. So it would automatically be in conjunction with the Security Headquarters (inaudible). It wouldn't be an isolated decision.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. We obviously have very limited information about the practical application of the system at the time. We have got two pieces of evidence that may give us a clue, and I'd just like to take you to those. The first of them is you refer to in your statement, and it's at 11-42 of Caselines, and it's a document that's in the National Archives. It has been put into the National Archives from the period. Just wait for that to come up. So it is dated 7th June 1974.

LT COL INNES: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: So it is shortly before the, relatively shortly before the Guildford Pub Bombing. Could you help with an explanation of what this document was and what it tells us?

LT COL INNES: You can clearly see that it's a report by the Aldershot detachment of 90 Security Section that were based at that time in Aldershot. The report has been drafted by Staff Sergeant MCCLLENAGHAN, excuse my pronunciation, and it's a report that outlines that the staff sergeant

was asked to attend a meeting at Aldershot Police Station with Detective Superintendent DICKIN of CID Hampshire, and an officer of SB, I presume Special Branch Hampshire. And then at the meeting a map of Bruneval Barracks in Aldershot was produced, and that map is annexed to this document, and the map had been recovered by Special Branch Liverpool on a house known to have been recently occupied, as it outlines, by amongst others Private MCMULLEN, one of the Army Catering Corps. It then goes on to outline MCMULLEN, who deserted from 1 Para whilst in Belfast on the 28th of January '72, and is strongly suspected of being responsible for an explosion which occurred in Palace Barracks, Holywood, and that's in Northern Ireland, on the 27th of January '72, and the handwriting with the map appears to match on a sample of MCMULLEN's handwriting. Then it goes on to say that Headquarters South East District and Headquarters 16 Para Brigade were briefed as to the existence of the map, on the 23rd of May 1974. Then it alludes to the 'Case History', it's entitled, and it says that in April '74 information was apparently received by Special Branch Liverpool that suspicious persons were residing at 66 Exeter Road, Bootle. The house was kept under observation for a period of two weeks and no one approached it, and so on the 13th of May '74 it was raided. Amongst other items there was found a 'Lucas

29' sectional map and what appeared to be two hand-drawn plans of military locations in Aldershot, one of which was annotated Bruneval Barracks, 1 Para. When shown to this detachment, however, it was realised that the two plans fitted together to form a complete plan of Bruneval Barracks.

MR SANDERS QC: Okay, can I just stop you there?

LT COL INNES: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: So, Aldershot detachment of 90 Security Section, what would that have been?

LT COL INNES: Again, I am not familiar, clearly, at the time of what it would have been, but I think within the manual of manual of army security it does refer to security staffs in headquarters, and they could be supported by security section. They were made up of individuals from the Intelligence Corps, who are intelligence, military intelligence specialists, who would be responsible, essentially, for counter-intelligence activities.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And so what we have is that a map of the barracks has been found that appears to have been produced by an insider who was a former member of the armed forces, someone who had deserted and then is suspected of being involved in terrorism. So he is strongly suspected of involvement in the Aldershot IRA bombing in 1972, and

also the other attack that you have mentioned. And this map is found, and so there is a consideration given as to what should be done in security terms, bearing in mind that it seems that there is a terrorist who has produced a map of the barracks. And then if I could just take you to paragraph 12 in terms of what it says there by way of the conclusion.

LT COL INNES: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Could you read that out, please?

LT COL INNES: Yes, certainly. “The plan is undated and there is no way of knowing what the intention was behind drawing it. However, despite this, Headquarters South East District and Headquarters 16 Para Brigade were briefed as to existence on the 23rd of May ’74. Both felt that the information did not warrant increasing the state of security alert from BIKINI Black.”

MR SANDERS QC: And so what that seems to tell us is that even finding information to suggest that there is a possibility of an attack, that is just consistent with the BIKINI Black alert state, which is that there is an attack possible. That is not, in and of itself, grounds for increasing to Black Special, because it is not sufficiently specific?

LT COL INNES: Unfortunately, without understanding the context at the time, and other information that was associated with this letter, I can't really form judgment on that.

MR SANDERS QC: But in terms of what is written there, the plan is undated so they do not know when the plan was produced. There is a suggestion that it was unlikely that it would have been produced a long time ago and then kept in the person's possession. But it is undated and there is no way of knowing what the intention was behind drawing it. So it is known that there is a plan, it could or could not have a suspicious motive behind it being produced, and we can say that does not lead to an increase in the security level.

LT COL INNES: Clearly that is what the report outlines, that the security (?) at that time, it wasn't considered necessarily increasing (?).

MR SANDERS QC: And that would seem to be consistent with your definition of the BIKINI Black alert level, which is that there is, an attack is possible but there is nothing more specific?

LT COL INNES: I believe so, without having any further information that would change that belief.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. The other possible piece of evidence that we have is in relation to an attack at the Pirbright camp the year before, in 1973, and I think you have seen the two articles from *The Times* that we have

got. If I could just turn these up. So first at 11-275, there on the screen there is a photo ...

LT COL INNES: Yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: ... which shows a clear-up or investigation operation after the bomb attack at Pirbright. And what we see from the contemporaneous media reporting is that there was a camp, tents outside the main Pirbright barracks, outside the perimeter fence there was a more temporary camp, and a stick of dynamite was either thrown or concealed and exploded, and it blew up some tents. So you see an investigation there, and if I can just take you to *The Times* article, which is at 11-276, the next ... And we have there, that is the 18th of September, so the event took place on the 17th of September. And I just want to take you to the, in particular the article that's at 11-279. That's it. On the right hand column there, 'Army camp blast'. "All army units in Britain were put on an even stricter security alert after a bomb exploded early yesterday among tents where 350 troops of the Household Cavalry were in camp at Pirbright, Surrey." So that suggests an increase in the alert state nationally after that. Is that how you would read that, an even stricter security alert?

LT COL INNES: I agree, that is what it suggests. Again, it's difficult, without knowing what the security state was at that time as to what (inaudible), but I

think it was consistent (inaudible) review the processes and consideration (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: And we know that whatever the increase was then, it appears that it is back at BIKINI Black by May, because of the Aldershot document suggesting that, that we have seen. Do you agree with that?

LT COL INNES: Potentially, again, but without knowing what the security state was, but again (inaudible) consistent (inaudible) definitions that have been reviewed (?), it certainly would, but again we have got nothing to confirm that.

MR SANDERS QC: If BIKINI Black was effectively the lowest state ...

LT COL INNES: Yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: ... and that's where it is, it seems to be in summer 1974, this suggests an increase at least when this incident happened. And then just to go on it says, "It ripped apart a tent containing stores and rations, and damaged two others. Two soldiers were badly shaken but unhurt. Hundreds of horses were stabled about 30 yards from the explosion. Police set up road blocks within a five mile radius of the camp at Stoney Castle ranges, and enquiries began into whether the bomb was planted in the ..." if you could just scroll, please "... in the stores tent or thrown from an adjacent field, which would have given the attacker an easy escape route. The bomb left a small crater, and debris and

fragments were widely scattered. The two soldiers were sleeping only a few yards away. One had boxes and crates thrown onto his bed by the explosion and the other was hurled to the floor as his bed was thrown into the air. The explosion was believed to have been caused by a one pound stick of gelignite. No warning was given.” And so from what you say, any incident like that would then prompt at least an increase in security while a review was undertaken to see if there is any specific threat?

LT COL INNES: It certainly would prompt a review. Again (inaudible) statement from a newspaper (inaudible) article, without anything else that I can officially refer to gain more substance to really give you an answer.

MR SANDERS QC: No, I understand you. It’s a somewhat speculative ...

LT COL INNES: Yeah, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... exercise. That deals with obviously the fact that there is a system in place, an alert system. We read out the basic principle, which is that protective security is based on individual awareness and understanding of the threat and its nature and the response to that. So it is the awareness of personnel about threat that is at the heart of security. Is that correct?

LT COL INNES: Yes, yes, I agree.

MR SANDERS QC: I would just like to ask you a bit about the, at least the processes and the policies that were in place in relation to education and training, and to take you to part 1 of volume 2 of the manual. So this is at 11-128 on Caselines.

LT COL INNES: Sorry, volume 1 (inaudible)?

MR SANDERS QC: It is volume 2, part 1. Can you see that, where, just above paragraph 511, it says 'Section 3, training and education'. And so this is, this draws out the distinction between training on the one hand, which is training for those people who are going to be specifically dealing with security, and then education, which is the more general security education of personnel so that they have a basis awareness themselves. And I just want to just refer you to paragraphs 513 to 515. So it says, "Education. The security education of personnel of all ranks and grades, both military and civilian, is an essential security measure. The responsibility for this rests with unit commanders. Certain basic aspects apply to each individual, e.g. he must be given knowledge and understanding of the threat to army security and in particular to that of his unit, he must be made aware of his personal responsibilities in the maintenance of protective security measures designed to meet the threat, he must be given a clear understanding of the nature of and danger to national security from subversion of the

individual and its effects, i.e. disaffection or coercion into traitorous acts. Above all, the necessity for a high standard of personal conduct, allied to the strict observance of security rules, must be made clear to him as forming the main defence of subversion in its different forms. Security education is therefore dependent upon and inseparable from the development of: A, vigilance in detecting and reporting suspicious behaviour or occurrences which may endanger unit security; B, high standards of morale, discipline and loyalty, a balanced outlook and sense of pride in service and unit. And then security education is to be included regularly in unit training programmes.” And so that is in the army security manual, setting out a requirement that everyone be given security education. Just generally speaking, if you have new recruits joining, young recruits, teenagers, how does the army make them aware of security threats when they are just joining, in their first few weeks when they have obviously taken on board a lot of information and are acclimatising to a different way of life, and so on? How does the army go about giving them the security information about threats that they need from day one or week one?

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LT COL INNES: I can't speak to the context of 1974 what would be delivered, and indeed I am not 'serving in that' (?) training establishment now. However, I do know the army (inaudible) introduced individual

training (inaudible) requirement. It was a similar, there are different names (?) but essentially the same. So there is a number of mandated training and it's got to be delivered to an individual, and it covers the full spectrum of what we call (inaudible) from terrorism (inaudible) sabotage and organised crime. It makes an individual aware of what the current threats are and what the threat is to them in the military whilst serving both at home or indeed overseas on operations. It will be, in essence, a lecture format, but there will be confirmation afterwards that the individual understands the content of what has been delivered to them. And then for regular soldiers that is delivered annually, you have got to take that test, or should I say that period of study. Indeed, they can now do it online as well, that is (inaudible) contract(?).

MR SANDERS QC: And if one looks at the army security manual from the 1970s, one would expect that there was similar training going on at that time, because that is what is mandated here in the security bible?

LT COL INNES: I would expect that, but again it's very difficult to comment (inaudible) context at the time.

MR SANDERS QC: Are you aware of any policy or practice for keeping new recruits on camp for a certain basic period so that they can be given basic

information that they need before then allowing them off camp to have free time and so on?

LT COL INNES: Again, I'm not serving in a training establishment now, so I'm not familiar with what the processes are. And I don't believe any restrictions (inaudible) in 1985(?) there were some restrictions that were in place. But again, it's very much as was said by the previous witness (inaudible) that was (inaudible) used to army life, in particular as a young 16 year old boy being away from his parents and probably adapting to the military environment was easier if you were to stay within the camp and immerse yourself 'in what' (?) army was at that point.

MR SANDERS QC: Just as a general proposition, how does it work in terms of the commanders controlling whether and when the soldiers are allowed off camp?

LT COL INNES: I think there would have to be a very good reason for it. As I said, it's a restriction of individual rights that you've got to justify. So it would be very rare, (inaudible) now, that a commanding officer, who essentially (inaudible) the soldiers inside the barracks, it would be an extreme measure, I would suggest, for that to occur. But certainly, 'it's not one' (?) outside of my training period, for the first three weeks, in 37 years, that I have ever experienced, and to not (inaudible)

very much was serving Osnabrück in the late-Eighties when one of the barracks was subject to an attack by the IRA and (inaudible) to ensure that people could still get on with their lives 'with no' (?) restrictions (inaudible) at that time in the service community.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. I mean, the reason I am asking about this is that one of the families has raised a concern about why the bases weren't on, quote-unquote, 'lockdown' so that all the recruits were just kept on camp because there was IRA activity going on. Is lockdown something that can happen on army barracks?

LT COL INNES: It would have to be to the extreme, as in 37 years I have never experienced an event that has required that, and certainly it is not one of the security contingencies that we currently have (inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: So you would ordinarily expect, when someone is off duty, that they are free to go and do what they want?

LT COL INNES: No, what you've got to understand is 'there's service personnel' (?) (inaudible) very much they live outside the wire, but particularly those that have families and are married. So what you've got to do is ensure that people are aware of the threat and they understand how to act, and again the previous 'related to' (?) checking underneath the car, again I recall doing that in Germany (inaudible) when I served in Northern Ireland, because of the particular threat education that was given

(inaudible) at the time. But what you're looking to do is to ensure that service personnel are best informed and educated about a potential threat and what measures they should conduct to protect themselves.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And of course the members of the armed forces are responsible adults and members of the community and they are not in detention while they are on a camp, they are not in custody.

LT COL INNES: Absolutely, they have the right to a free life.

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, thank you. You heard earlier on, Dr BOAG-MUNROE talking about, or it may have been in the statement, I think it may have been the statement of Julia WESTON-DAVIES, talking about some places in Guildford being, quote-unquote, 'out of bounds'. Does a barracks or a garrison commander have any power to prescribe places that members of the armed forces shouldn't go when they're off-camp?

LT COL INNES: I am not familiar with now (?). I think, if I stretch my memory back in my early stages of career, that there was (inaudible) anything that was terrorist related, it was normally because of any premises that was known for drug use or criminality that soldiers were warned to stay away from, rather than be banned from that location.

MR SANDERS QC: So that would just be advice about good conduct rather than any kind of legal, "You must not enter this particular area"?

LT COL INNES: In my experience, yes. And again, there's nothing I can see within (inaudible) security (inaudible) placing locations out of bounds.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And just on this topic, if I can just take you to the, it's part 2 of volume 2 of the army security manual, we have it at 11-184 of Caselines. So this is the 1977 document, not necessarily in force in 1974, but I just want to refer you to paragraph 203, where it talks about the threat. "With the growth of terrorist activities, it has become necessary to implement new measures and improve existing ones. This requires a shift away from the open plan barracks towards the more traditional enclosed barrack complex, but without segregating the serviceman and his family from the local civilian community." That last proposition there, is that important that service personnel remain able to mix in the community, to socialise with friends and family, and not to be cut off from the outside world?

LT COL INNES: Absolutely. The military are very much the (inaudible) and heart of the community, both financially supporting the local community and indeed supporting activities. If you constrain(?) the military from doing that I think it would be a challenge of economic (?) (inaudible) other positive environment wherever the military were located.

MR SANDERS QC: So it is an important part army life is to remain part of the community, local churches, sports clubs and so on, and not to become segregated?

LT COL INNES: All of what you've said (inaudible), yes, and indeed, as I said, investing in the local community as well.

MR SANDERS QC: Can I ask, from your general experience, what we have heard this morning about troops not wearing their uniform when off camp, and there will obviously be exceptions for when they are on duty or for Remembrance Day, and so on, but that seems to have been a general rule. Are you familiar with that?

LT COL INNES: I am, just through different periods of my service. I mean, current army policy encourages service personnel to wear their uniform (inaudible) whilst on duty, but mostly(?) if, if travelling from home to a place of work, as I do, and albeit the individuals do not have to, (inaudible) it's not compulsory to wear uniform. But there have been periods, again the period that I was in Germany, when the IRA had struck one of the barracks, when people were then moving outside of the establishment, at that point it was a case of putting a jacket or a uniform (inaudible) changing (inaudible) to travel home. So they weren't promoting themselves as being in the military. But again, that's the last time I experienced that I think was in 1987 to 1989, and I then moved off to Northern Ireland to serve two years, which again (inaudible) it was a very different set of circumstances that you had to follow.

MR SANDERS QC: But the prohibition on wearing uniform when going into town is an example of a security measure that can be taken to mitigate risk, is that right?

LT COL INNES: It's a measure that could be taken, and again, it could be taken today if the specific (inaudible) terrorist (inaudible), but certainly there is nothing at the moment that stops a service person going into Tesco's to do their shopping as they leave work prior to go home in uniform.

MR SANDERS QC: Yeah, and of course it's not a perfect measure, in the sense that you will often be able to tell whether you are looking at a group of soldiers, particularly if you are near a camp, because they have got short hair and they have a slightly different bearing to perhaps other people?

LT COL INNES: I would agree that, again (inaudible) men or women, but with very different accents, as a collective, you would naturally associate that with the military.

MR SANDERS QC: Yes. I mean, obviously the Scots Guards were based at Pirbright, and so a young Scottish man with short hair in Guildford, it would be a good chance that he would be a soldier?

LT COL INNES: (inaudible)

MR SANDERS QC: You have, in your statement you have very fairly said you can't say whether or not the rules in the army security manual were applied at

any of the camps around Guildford in 1974 because you weren't there.

But there clearly were extensive policies, rules and procedures, and the army manual talks about security surveys and inspections, and reviews and checks. Would you expect that this was followed, at the time, in the army in the 1970s?

LT COL INNES: (inaudible), again (inaudible), I can only make a judgment. I would expect it to be that(?), only because of the levels of assurance we apply today. When I look at the manual it refers to assurance, and that's all very, all (?) very much what the staff headquarters would be looking at, to go and assure the security policies, processes, training that was in place, and one of the areas they would be assuring is the awareness of the threat.

MR SANDERS QC: And if you have security officers at a camp, they have got to do their job and follow the rules and regulations set for them, so it would be surprising if they were laissez-faire about security.

LT COL INNES: Well, I think it's (inaudible) in the manual, the (inaudible) security officers, the regimental 2IC, or the battalion 2IC, so the, the senior major in the regiment, and they would be, they would generally have taken that responsibility very seriously. If things go wrong it would reflect poorly on them, and they are essentially the commanding

officer's right hand person. So that's why 'it exists' (?) at that level in the regiment.

MR SANDERS QC: Yeah. And it is a fairly trite point to make, but obviously the army is well known as being a bit of a stickler for rules and regulations, is that correct?

LT COL INNES: Again, if that's the perception that you've seen, the army clearly has good policy, and I think we have rigour in ensuring that we adhere to that policy.

MR SANDERS QC: And it's a disciplined environment. The word 'regiment' is chosen because it's a regimented environment, it's an environment in which rules and regulations are taken seriously?

LT COL INNES: Rules and regulations obviously are taken seriously and adhered to.

MR SANDERS QC: And can I just, to just sort of reinforce that point, just take you to one document in the manual. This is at 11-134.

LT COL INNES: Which volume is that?

MR SANDERS QC: Which volume is that? That is annex A. I think it might be part 1 of volume 2.

CORONER: **It is, volume 2, part 1.**

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MR SANDERS QC: It is on your screen, if that is helpful.

LT COL INNES: (inaudible), yeah, I see.

MR SANDERS QC: So this is annex A, this is a commanders' security aide memoire, and it says, "Copies of this aide memoire are available in card form from the Ministry of Defence," so it was something that commanders can have as a separate card to remind them. And then it sets out all of the matters that they had to bear in mind in relation to, first, document security, and then protective security, these are the things for them to consider, and they have a card to remind them of these matters at all times, and that is consistent with the fact that it was all taken very seriously, isn't it?

LT COL INNES: Absolutely, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. Thank you, Colonel, I do not have any further questions. That has been very helpful, and thank you for your time. There may be some other questions if you just wait there.

CORONER: **Colonel, can I just ask you, in respect of education, you spoke about the education, and you have spoken about the soldiers being told, or educated as to what measures they should take to protect themselves and being made aware of the threat level, whether that level may or may not be at one particular time. But you have also conceded that of course they were identifiable as soldiers. That was the reality of it, if there was a group of soldiers they were identifiable as such. Now on top of that, of course, there were, as I**

think the previous witness agreed, there were venues, and we are talking about Guildford so you may not have had personal knowledge of the town because perhaps you were too young, but there were venues in Guildford that were known to be popular amongst the soldiers, that were pubs. That is right, is it not?

LT COL INNES: Again, as you say, sir, I have no knowledge of Guildford at the time, but my experience is that naturally where there are soldiers they will routinely go to various pubs.

CORONER: **But I suppose what I am really getting at is, what could be done? In the sense that if you have got identifiable soldiers going to a popular place where soldiers go, yes, you can teach them to protect themselves. Well looking under a car before you get into a car is a way of protecting yourself. Being aware of the threat level makes you aware of the suspicious packages and the like. But if you are in a very crowded pub, what measures could you (inaudible)?**

LT COL INNES: It is difficult to give one answer, but the military, by the nature of the job, particularly in the army, you are trained to be aware of your surroundings, and particularly to identify if something is different. I think it is part 2, volume 2 (inaudible) 1967(?) does refer to contingencies, and one of which is a pub drill where we carry out ...

CORONER: Sorry, one of which was ...?

LT COL INNES: The pub drill. So it is referred to ...

CORONER: Yes.

LT COL INNES: ... (inaudible). So it's making soldiers particularly aware of their environment, to look for things that are suspicious, and then take action. One of the other measures, again in my career, we used to have a term called 'shark watch'. One person would go out and they would not be drinking and the others would be drinking, so it wasn't a popular task, but it's one that within the group we always take up, and again it's just so they had their wits about them, and we're aware of the surroundings, and to take action if necessary. So I think there has always been a theme of promoting of 'be aware', and that is not just be aware in barracks, it's be aware when you go outside, when you're off duty, your surroundings, and indeed 'that was the importance' (?) of the local threat as part of training on the, promoted on the part 1 'routine' (?) orders, as I would call them.

CORONER: Thank you. Ms BARTON.

MS BARTON QC: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Mr BERRY.

MR BERRY: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Mr PLEETH.

MR PLEETH: Thank you, sir, just a couple of matters. Lieutenant Colonel, at paragraph 15 of your witness statement you deal with some of the other structures and hierarchy that existed in the Ministry of Defence at the time. You have already explained that the security threat nationally was assessed at a governmental level. Help us with understanding the structures that you explain at paragraph 15. How did it feed down from there. You start with the Defence Council, what was their role?

LT COL INNES: For (inaudible), the Defence Council outlined(?), the responsibility for the security of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces rest ultimately with the Defence Council, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. Authority is, however, delegated to the Admiralty, Army and Air Force Boards for security within the service chains of command (inaudible) the army department. The Director of Security, Army, was responsible to the Army Board through the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, for the formulation of security policy for the army chain of command, including, A, for the provision of advice and guidance to army commanders on all aspects of security, B, the promulgation of instructions laid down, minimum standards of security measures to be applied(?). And then C, the Director of Security, Army. The Director of Security, Army, has responsibility for the following. A, the

provision of security advice and assistance by inspecting and training to master general (inaudible) outstanding outstation (?) establishments. The security of army elements and (inaudible) units at these establishments is the responsibility of the appropriate command headquarters, working in close consultation with the heads of establishment. The personnel security of the United Kingdom (inaudible) civilian staff employed in the army chain of command.

MR PLEETH: And so that deals with the structures that were in place at a headquarter, at a senior level with the Ministry of Defence and army, does it not?

LT COL INNES: Yes, through to, into army headquarters.

MR PLEETH: And sitting underneath the structure that you have just described, there existed staff security sections, is that right?

LT COL INNES: That is correct.

MR PLEETH: And you deal with this at paragraph 16 of your witness statement, don't you?

LT COL INNES: I do.

MR PLEETH: And what was the role of the General Staff Security?

LT COL INNES: General Staff Security sections exist in headquarters in accordance with the level of command and local requirements. The role of the General Staff Security is summarised as, A, advising commanders on

security matters and providing the channel for formulation and issue of protective security policy; B, producing the security intelligence and maintaining an up-to-date assessment of the threat to security in consultation with the intelligence staff; C, organising with all branches of the staff matters affecting protective security measures; and D, providing advice and assistance to (inaudible) formations and units.

MR PLEETH: And so what you have outlined there is the structure from a governmental assessment of security, through the Defence Council, to the army department, to the Director of Security, through to the General Staff Security sections which provide more specific advice to local commanders, is that right?

LT COL INNES: That's correct.

MR PLEETH: And as I think you outlined at the very beginning of your evidence, the responsibility for security at any particular location is that of the commanding officer, is that right? Or now known as head establishment, I think.

LT COL INNES: That is correct.

MR PLEETH: And the policies which you have reviewed, the army manual of security provides for the establishment of a specific individual responsible for security within each location, is that right?

LT COL INNES: That's correct.

MR PLEETH: And that's called the unit security officer?

LT COL INNES: That's correct.

MR PLEETH: And you explain, don't you, at paragraph 19, what the unit security officer was responsible for? Would you outline that for us?

LT COL INNES: Certainly. A unit security officer was the commanding officer's security adviser and (inaudible) trained by attendance at either an intelligence centre or a command unit security officer's course. In large units with appreciable amounts of information and, or material to protect, the unit security officer may be appointed chairman of a security committee within which detailed responsibilities are delegated, whose duties fall under the follow heads. A, (inaudible) an assessment of the current threat to security of the unit, assessment of the essential security interests held by the unit, and planning and organising the current security measures to be put into use. B, standing orders. The promulgation of unit security standing orders to provide for the operation of security measures and the notification of the security responsibilities of all ranks and (inaudible) staff. And C, security training and education. The organisation of the training of individuals responsible for specific measures and the education of personnel on the threat to security and their responsibilities for countering it.

MR PLEETH: And so we see there how that national threat level feeds through to both the commander and then the individual specifically responsible for security and their individual, and their roles which they are required to perform in accordance with the policy?

LT COL INNES: Correct.

MR PLEETH: And by reason of the answers that you have a moment ago to counsel to the inquests, your expectation is that army personnel follow that policy and apply both ...

LT COL INNES: Correct.

MR PLEETH: ... the letter of the policy and the spirit of it as well?

LT COL INNES: That is correct.

MR PLEETH: And the policy provides, doesn't it, both the part 1 and part 2 orders which are described as routine orders, but also for specific orders relating to security matters, doesn't it?

LT COL INNES: That's correct.

MR PLEETH: And those are, in the policy at least, described as security instructions, aren't they?

LT COL INNES: Yes, that's correct.

MR PLEETH: And you explain what the role of security instructions are at paragraph 20, don't you? What was the role of those specific instructions that could be issued to deal with security matters where appropriate?

LT COL INNES: Security instructions issued by the Ministry of Defence, and including (inaudible) security, amplified as necessary to meet local conditions by formation and unit security orders, and instructions (inaudible) rules and practice. This is a system based upon the current threat to security and experience, consisting of, A, procedures for control of access to security interests, B, standards of protection to be applied to them, and C, rules for the conduct of personnel.

MR PLEETH: And I won't take you to it, but at paragraph 22 you explain that the annex B and annex O to part 2, sorry, volume 2, part 1, of the security manual, provides both a guide to the formation of those instructions, the security instructions, and a checklist for those matters which should be included within security instructions. That is right, isn't it?

LT COL INNES: That is correct.

MR PLEETH: And one of the areas which must be included are security warnings about local threat levels, is that correct?

LT COL INNES: That is correct.

MR PLEETH: And what we are talking about here, security instructions, these are in addition to the part 1 and part 2, or otherwise known as routine orders, is that right?

LT COL INNES: That's correct. 'Cause some of them (inaudible) very detailed and site specific security orders 'to all' (?) personnel.

MR PLEETH: You have already touched on, I think, the obligation for assurance within the army, and that is dealt with within the manuals, isn't it?

LT COL INNES: That's correct, yes.

MR PLEETH: Indeed, at paragraph 24 you explain that the manual imposes an obligation for inspection and review on the security arrangements at each establishment, is that right?

LT COL INNES: That is correct, yes.

MR PLEETH: And finally, you have dealt already with education, and again I won't ask you to turn it up, but annex P, and sir, for your reference it is 11-170, is an annex which sets out, doesn't it, the expectations of what should be included within a security education lecture?

LT COL INNES: It does, that's correct, yes.

MR PLEETH: One of which is the current and local threat that exists, is that right? You deal with this at the end of paragraph 29.

LT COL INNES: That's correct, I am familiar with that, yes.

MR PLEETH: Yes, thank you, Lieutenant Colonel, that is all of the questions I have.

CORONER: **Thank you very much. Mr SANDERS, anything?**

MR SANDERS QC: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Thank you very much, Colonel, that concludes your evidence and you are free to stay or to go as you choose, thank you.

LT COL INNES: Thank you.

(Witness withdrew)

CORONER: I think we will take our mid-morning break. The next witness, I think (inaudible) relation, is it Patricia HUNT (inaudible)?

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, so she was asked to come for midday.

MR PLEETH: She is here, sir.

CORONER: Sorry?

MR PLEETH: She is here.

CORONER: Oh, she is, excellent. Okay. Well we will have a short break, 15 minutes, please, and then we will come back and pick up with (inaudible).

CLERK: Court please rise.

(A short adjournment)

CORONER: Mr SANDERS, I think Patricia HUNT is up.

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, if we could call Patricia HUNT.

CORONER: Thank you. Patricia HUNT, please.

MRS PATRICIA HUNT (sworn):

CORONER: Thank you very much. Do sit down.

MRS HUNT: Thank you.

CORONER: Good morning.

MRS HUNT: Good morning. Afternoon.

CORONER: Or good afternoon, yes. Can you come forward just a little bit?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

CORONER: I need you to be as close to the microphone as possible. Not quite right up against it. But speak up nice and loudly, please, because we need to record what you are saying and we need to hear what you are saying. And when you are asked questions, do not rush ahead too quickly, please, because some of us will be taking notes.

Can you give me your full name, please?

MRS HUNT: Yes, it's Patricia Ann HUNT.

CORONER: Thank you. I am going to ask you to come forward a bit, Mrs HUNT, because you must try and speak as loudly as you can with a real effort, if you would please, so that we can all hear you. I am going to pass you in a moment to Mr SANDERS who is going to ask you some questions.

MR SANDERS QC: Mrs HUNT, good afternoon.

MRS HUNT: Good afternoon.

MR SANDERS QC: I am going to start by just taking you to your statement. I think you have got a hard copy in front of you, and just to, for everyone else's benefit, it is at 10-77 on the Caselines database. So if you could just

look at your statement, you have given your full name, you have given a 'care of' Dorset Council address.

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And you work for Dorset Council as a swimming teacher?

MRS HUNT: That's correct, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you, and just looking at this statement, it is seven pages long and the, on the last page, signed by you on the 10th of June.

MRS HUNT: Yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: Is that correct? And that is your signature there?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And can you please confirm that the contents of the statement are true?

MRS HUNT: Yes, as far as I remember.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And to reassure you, we completely understand that this is a long time ago and that you are not certain about a lot of these memories, and we have seen what you said about that. It is not at all a memory test. If you are not sure just say, it is fine. Looking at your statement, you say you were 20 at the time ...

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... of the Guildford Pub Bombing, and you were a Second Lieutenant in the WRAC, correct?

MRS HUNT: (no audible reply)

MR SANDERS QC: And you were a platoon commander?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: So you were doing the same job, as I understand it, as Dr BOAG-MUNROE, who was then Gill TAYLOR at the time?

MRS HUNT: Absolutely, yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And your maiden name, so the name you were known by at the time, was CAMPBELL, is that correct?

MRS HUNT: (inaudible)

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you.

CORONER: **Sorry, I am going to have to ask you to speak up a bit because I am struggling to hear you a bit. So, sorry, just say that again, please, what your maiden name at the time?**

MRS HUNT: Was CAMPBELL.

CORONER: **CAMPBELL, thank you.**

MR SANDERS QC: Could you just please help us first with an outline of your army career, so the time you spent in the army?

MRS HUNT: Well I spent, well I can't remember, I had to look this up, but, you know, I joined the WRAC around 1973 and completed my training, as it says in the statement, on the 30th of April 1974 when I was commissioned. From there I was posted to the barracks at Guildford.

Following that I went to 'Three Two' Regiment in Bulford for around two years, which also, I haven't put here, included a tour of Northern Ireland. Following that I was at the National Defence College for about six months, and then I was posted back to Guildford, before I left the army.

MR SANDERS QC: And so how long were you in the army for altogether?

MRS HUNT: Five years.

MR SANDERS QC: Five years. And the WRAC, what was the role within the wider army picture of the WRAC?

MRS HUNT: That, at the time, was mostly administrative for officers. For the other ranks they would have been drivers, signal people, medics, those sorts of jobs that slotted in. There was no carrying of guns at the time.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And the, all of the other rank recruits to the WRAC would go through basic training at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks, is that correct?

MRS HUNT: Six weeks basic training, yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: And when you were there, at the time in question, you were effectively delivering that basic training?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And was that a rolling programme, so you would have one intake of recruits and then another intake, and then another?

MRS HUNT: We did six weeks, we have a week off, and then another six weeks, and that's, yes, it just carried on like that, as 'they all' (?) progressed.

MR SANDERS QC: So it was quite a high volume of recruits coming through?

MRS HUNT: Mostly. Some courses had less than others, others had higher numbers, it just depended on who was being recruited at the time.

MR SANDERS QC: And then after the basic training, is this right, that the recruits would then go on to specialist trades along the lines you have described ...

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... so they would go on elsewhere?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And be potentially absorbed into other units, although the WRAC would remain their parent unit?

MRS HUNT: Absolutely, and if there were large groups of WRAC within those units there would have been a officer, a Women's Royal Army Corps officer attached to them.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. The Queen Elizabeth Barracks at the time, that is just on the outskirts of Guildford, is that correct?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And so are you able to give a rough indication of the size of the establishment, the number of army personnel there?

MRS HUNT: I can't give numbers 'cause I can't remember what there might be, but it was quite unorganised(?), and I can run through the departments, if you like, if that's what you'd like me to do.

MR SANDERS QC: Yeah.

MRS HUNT: Okay. A headquarters at the top, with a colonel in command, a major second-in-command, a captain as an adjutant, with a second lieutenant as an assistant adjutant. There would have been other support parts, like the, like, like the education corps had a department there, there would have been the kit providing people. There was a chaplain. There was, and then there was the two training companies.

MR SANDERS QC: And the training companies had within them platoons and you were a platoon commander.

MRS HUNT: Yeah, there was two platoons in each company. So there was two companies, there was 1 Company, 2 Company, and within those two companies there would have been two platoons.

MR SANDERS QC: And each platoon was about 30?

MRS HUNT: Roughly, (inaudible) numbers, (inaudible) a bit up and down with them.

MR SANDERS QC: It would vary. And you mentioned that your company commander was a Captain Rosemary?

MRS HUNT: Yeah, I can't remember her surname, I'm afraid.

MR SANDERS QC: It's the same name that Dr BOAG-MUNROE remembers. The names that we found out were Major Patricia INESON, Captain Rona BURNS and Captain Elsie EDWARDS.

MRS HUNT: Oh, it might have been Marina. Marina, was that?

MR SANDERS QC: Well I have got Rona BURNS.

MRS HUNT: Rona. That sounds familiar, but I can't, I can't actually put an honest answer to that.

MR SANDERS QC: No, that is fine, thank you. And what was the makeup of a platoon? So the sub-unit that you were in charge of, what did that comprise?

MRS HUNT: We had a sergeant and I think there was one corporal. There may have been two, but I think there was one. And then the girls.

MR SANDERS QC: And then the girls. And all the personnel are on the camp were presumably women?

MRS HUNT: The majority. I mean, and I think, if I remember rightly, a couple of the education corps people were male, and I think the, well the chaplain was male. I think the doctor may have been male as well, but I can't remember if there was anything else, anybody else.

MR SANDERS QC: And what did the course, the six week basic training course, what did it cover?

MRS HUNT: We did a little bit of military law, the sort of things they might need to know. We did a bit of WRAC military history. They'd have learned

about personal care. What else would they have done? They'd have learnt how to look after their equipment. They'd have learnt marching, so discipline, those sorts of things. But it was ... I can't remember what else we did, to be honest, but it was very basic.

MR SANDERS QC: And what ages were the recruits?

MRS HUNT: They were between 17 and maybe 25.

MR SANDERS QC: So a range, with some school-leavers and some ...

MRS HUNT: Yeah, absolutely.

MR SANDERS QC: ... some who had worked elsewhere?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And did they all live on the camp?

MRS HUNT: Oh yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And that was compulsory?

MRS HUNT: Yeah, they lived in what we call blocks. They were, they were like dormitory buildings, yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: And what were their, I mean in terms of when they were on duty, when did their days begin and end?

MRS HUNT: Well as soon as they got up for breakfast and got their uniforms on, that's when their day began, but I can't remember the times now, it's a bit too long ago. And then they would go through a morning of whatever was put up for them, like an hour of drill, or it would be

something like that, and then into the classrooms for a bit. Those sorts of things. A bit of PE, possibly. What else? A break for lunch, more in the afternoon, and then break for the evening. But very often there might have been something going on in the evening. Maybe they had to do kit care, or something of that nature.

MR SANDERS QC: And in the evening, so when they're off duty, were they free to leave the camp?

MRS HUNT: This is where I'm a bit hazy. But during the week I do not think they were allowed to leave the camp. But they had a NAAFI, places they could go on camp for, you know, a drink or a social meeting, or whatever. Weekends were different, they were allowed off at weekends, they'd do some shopping, or go to the pub. Except if they were 17 when they weren't supposed to go into pubs.

MR SANDERS QC: Did you have 17 ...?

MRS HUNT: We did have 17 year olds and they were told not to go to pubs.

MR SANDERS QC: Not even for a soft drink?

MRS HUNT: They were told not to go to pubs.

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you, that's helpful. In terms of their education or training in security matters, you have mentioned part 1 and part 2 orders ...

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: ... and it doesn't matter which way round they go, but I think there are two types of order.

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: And could you describe what they were and what kind of information they will have contained?

MRS HUNT: I'm going to have to look at this a minute, 'cause I can't remember what was said. (inaudible) part 1. Part 1 orders was what was happening during the day, so they (inaudible) maybe the day before or that evening to describe (?) things like ... I'm just trying to think. Oh yes, guard, guard roster, mealtimes, those sorts of things. So their day to day, day to day stuff.

MR SANDERS QC: And the part 2 orders?

MRS HUNT: Part 2 was more about promotions and information that was a bit more, about what the actual staff would have been, needed to know. So I'm not so sure that ... I mean, I can't remember clearly, I don't think that the girls would have needed to see those.

MR SANDERS QC: And how were the orders published, or disseminated?

MRS HUNT: They were published on paper and put up on notice boards.

MR SANDERS QC: And then there was a requirement to read them?

MRS HUNT: They, yeah, (inaudible), yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: And do you remember any documents that might have been described as security standing orders or security instructions?

MRS HUNT: I struggle with the word 'security', because the standing orders was more, which was the thing that was put up all over the camp, and it would have been standard for the whole army, would have been things like what to do if there was a fire, what to do if a bomb did go off on camp, or, you know, those sorts of things, where to meet, those are the sort of things that would have been issued. If that's what you mean ...

MR SANDERS QC: Mmm hmm.

MRS HUNT: ... but yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: You mentioned that you had lived in Belfast as a, as a teenager?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Was that your family were in the ...?

MRS HUNT: My father was in the Royal Signals.

MR SANDERS QC: So you were out there for a couple of years?

MRS HUNT: Yes, I went to school there.

MR SANDERS QC: And that was during the very early phases of the Troubles?

MRS HUNT: Yeah, the first bomb for a few years went off the night we arrived in 1969.

MR SANDERS QC: And you said that when you returned to the mainland, returned to the Great Britain mainland, you were surprised how complacent people were about the IRA?

MRS HUNT: Yeah, yeah, at the time. But I mean, like everybody else, I just got used to it. I think, I don't think people just believed that the IRA would attack civilians. At least not at that stage.

MR SANDERS QC: But you said that the awareness of the threat that they posed was much higher within the military?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Do you recall yourself being given training about the threat from the IRA of security matters?

MRS HUNT: No. I just knew that I knew it. I don't know how I knew it, but yeah, we all knew, we all knew that we had to be careful. We all knew to keep our eyes open for parcel. But then the civilian population at the time also really knew.

MR SANDERS QC: And did you, do you remember, and it doesn't matter if you don't, but do you remember giving training or advice to the recruits about security matters, remaining vigilant, checking under cars, checking for packages, that type of things?

MRS HUNT: Not personally, I don't remember it. But they must, they, they knew, yeah.

MR SANDERS QC: And would the advice that they were given, would that apply not only to what they were doing on the camp but to what they were doing when they were off camp and off duty and out in the town?

MRS HUNT: Not sure about that, to be honest. I mean, I don't, I don't remember ever giving any, any instructions like that. I don't remember receiving any.

MR SANDERS QC: But you have a general memory that there would have been an awareness of the existence of a threat?

MRS HUNT: Yeah, a general memory. I mean, a vague memory that, that everybody was aware that parcel bombs were a possibility.

MR SANDERS QC: And do you recall that incoming post was checked for suspicious of explosives, or ...?

MRS HUNT: I know there was later. I can't believe that it wasn't at the time, but I'm not 100 per cent sure of that.

MR SANDERS QC: But you have no specific memory of security posters or notices, or checking under cars, or ...?

MRS HUNT: No, no, (inaudible). Not at that time, no.

MR SANDERS QC: I think you say that the BIKINI alert system is something that sounds familiar?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: Is that a familiarity that goes back to that time, or just it's more general than that?

MRS HUNT: It's more general than that.

MR SANDERS QC: Do you remember any, at the gatehouse coming in or out of the camp, any signs about what the alert state was, or anything like that?

MRS HUNT: No, no.

MR SANDERS QC: You have mentioned that there was a rule about not wearing uniforms off camp?

MRS HUNT: Yes.

MR SANDERS QC: What was the rationale for that?

MRS HUNT: I think more at the time, in 1974, the rationale behind that was that you, they only needed to wear their uniforms for work, and if you were off camp you were socialising and you didn't need to be in uniform. The officers at the time, I can't remember anybody leaving camp in uniform. I mean, I just don't have that memory.

MR SANDERS QC: From your memory, that wasn't to do with security threats, it was ...?

MRS HUNT: No. I think it was just ...

MR SANDERS QC: Not necessary.

MRS HUNT: ... just not necessary.

MR SANDERS QC: Protect the uniforms and ... yeah. So the recruits were, when they were off duty they were allowed into the town, but you think that that was more likely just at the weekends?

MRS HUNT: I think so.

MR SANDERS QC: Do you have any recollection of a three week period, or the first half of the training course having more restriction on leaving the camp?

MRS HUNT: No. I don't (inaudible).

CORONER: **I am so sorry, I did not catch that. When you say you do not remember that, do you mean that that does not accord with your recollection, in other words the girls were allowed off camp ...?**

MRS HUNT: I just don't, I don't remember whether that was the case or not.

CORONER: **Oh, I see, all right, thank you.**

MR SANDERS QC: Thank you. And then the night of the bombing itself, could you just help with what your involvement or what your recollection of the night is?

MRS HUNT: I'm afraid I wasn't there, I was actually away for the weekend, along with a few other people on leave, and I actually didn't hear about it till the Sunday. So, when I got back to camp, and I found out that all this has happened, and that one of my girls had been, I think one, had been injured, and that two of Gill's had been killed.

MR SANDERS QC: And obviously a number of others were seriously injured.

MRS HUNT: And lots of other people, and I think, well lots of people were hurt
(inaudible).

MR SANDERS QC: What was the impact of the incident on the camp and on the WRAC at
the time?

MRS HUNT: Honestly, I don't have any recollection of that time at all. Did we
carry on as normal? I don't know, I can't, I honestly can't remember.

MR SANDERS QC: Do you remember if there was any change in practice as to whether or
not the girls went into Guildford, did they stay on the camp, or were
there any changes in security procedures?

MRS HUNT: Again, I can't remember. I don't think so, but I can't remember. I
really can't remember.

MR SANDERS QC: (inaudible) That has been very helpful, thank you very much. If you
just wait there, there may be other questions.

CORONER: **Thank you very much.**

MS BARTON QC: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: **Ms BARTON, thank you. Mr BERRY.**

MR BERRY: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: **Mr PLEETH.**

MR PLEETH: No, thank you, sir.

CORONER: Thank you very much, Mrs HUNT. That concludes your evidence and you are free to stay or to go as you choose. Thank you very much.

MRS HUNT: (inaudible), thank you.

(The witness withdrew)

CORONER: Mr SANDERS, I think that leaves us with four statements, I think, to be read, is that right?

MR SANDERS QC: Yes, sir, that is correct. So I will hand over to Mr FLINN and Ms KUZMENKO, but we have statements from the relief landlord and landlady at the Horse and Groom Public House, which is Alan BRISTOW and Heather BRISTOW. Alan BRISTOW is deceased. Heather BRISTOW is living overseas and unwilling to assist the inquests. Then there is a statement from Edna LEGG, who was the cleaner at the pub, and then a statement from Maureen O'SULLIVAN, who was in the pub at the time. I will let those statements be read out. I wanted also, at the same time as Maureen O'SULLIVAN's statement is read, is to display her plan that she refers to in the statement, so we can get an idea of the layout.

CORONER: (inaudible) But just so that people understand, when you say that Heather BRISTOW was unwilling to assist, the fact is that I have

no jurisdiction. If she is abroad there had not been very much I can do about that.

MR SANDERS QC: That is correct, sir, yes.

CORONER: **Thank you.**

MR FLINN: Sir, thank you very much. Sir, as Mr SANDERS has said, the first of the read statements under Rule 23 is a statement from a Mr Alan BRISTOW, and your intention to have this read was communicated to IPs at a previous PIR and no objections have been received in respect of that. The Caselines page reference I hope should be 2-581, and the unique reference number is S383.

CORONER: **Thank you very much.**

MR FLINN: (Statements of Alan BRISTOW read in full)

“I am a relief public house manager employed by the Courage Brewery. On the 23rd of September 1974 my wife, Heather, and I took over the Horse and Groom Public House in North Street, Guildford. We were to have stood in for the regular manager, Mr Peter SWALLOW, for a period of two weeks whilst he was on holiday. The first weekend we were there was very busy, especially the Friday and Saturday night when the majority of the customers were servicemen and women. The following week, up to and including

Friday, the 4th of October, business dropped off considerably and the number of army personnel using the pub was noticeably fewer.

“On Saturday, the 5th of October 1974, at 5.30pm, I opened up for the evening’s business. From the moment I opened the doors we were extremely busy, most of the trade coming again from army personnel. I later discovered that this was the first night out for a new intake at the camp.

“I remained at the bar sorting and collecting glasses until about 9.40pm, when I left to go down to the Surrey Arms Public House for a drink. I went out via the main front door. Before leaving, I cleared all the tables of empties, including the tables in the corner by the jukebox and fireplaces. I cannot remember who was sitting at these tables. The pub was still very crowded and that particular corner is very dimly lit. I would estimate that at that time between 65 and 75 per cent of my customers were army personnel. As I left the pub there were a group of about eight youngsters standing outside. They looked like squaddies. They seemed to be deciding whether to go in or not. I can’t describe any of these lads, except to say that they had short haircuts.

“I walked down to the Surrey Arms, which must have taken me two minutes at the most. The barman, John CHADWICK, was expecting

me and had a beer already poured for me. I had been there five minutes at the most when I heard the sound of a large explosion nearby. I went outside and saw that my pub was badly damaged. The front was blown out. There was rubble all over the road and injured people everywhere. I ran down to the pub and went straight in looking for my wife. There were injured people on the floor and others trying to get out. I looked all around the building for my wife but couldn't find her. I came out and looked around for her in North Street, saw Norman, one of the staff, and asked him to look for her. A few minutes later I found her in North Street. She had an injury to her hand and I arranged for her to get to hospital.

"I then went back in the pub. The scene was much the same as before.

I then noticed a man standing behind the fruit machine drinking a pint of beer. I told him to get out, but he said, "Don't worry about me, I'm all right." I again asked him to leave, but he remained there saying he was all right. I then ejected him. I would describe him as being 45 to 50 years old, five foot eight inches tall, medium build, clean shaven, with dark hair, slightly receding, greased-back and with a slight wave.

He had dark-rimmed glasses with thick lenses and was wearing a dark coloured suit. After this, I generally assisted the police and fire brigade to clear the pub.

“During the 12 days I was at the Horse and Groom, I can’t recall seeing or hearing anything or anyone suspicious. We did have a group of about 12 Irishmen who came into the pub regularly during the evenings. I don’t know any of their names. I think they came from a local building site. They normally left at about 7pm. I think there were three or four of them in the pub on the evening of the explosion. I don’t know whether they had left before I did.”

Sir, and that is signed, and that is dated the 9th of October 1974.

CORONER: **Thank you.**

MR FLINN: There is a second statement from Mr BRISTOW, which I will go on to read now. The unique reference number is S383A and the Caselines page reference is 2-583.

“Further to the statement I made previously with regard to the bomb that exploded in the public house where I was a relief manager on the 5th of October 1974, the public house was the Horse and Groom, North Street, Guildford. As far as I can remember, the clock in the bar was situated over the centre of the bar and set rather high. I believe it was either an electric or battery run clock, and to the best of my knowledge, it kept good time and would have been at the correct time within a minute or so. I have indicated on the map where the clock is situated.”

And, sir, once again that is signed, and this statement is later, it is dated the 29th of January 1975.

MS KUZMENKO: Sir, we have, firstly, Heather BRISTOW's statement, which is S164, reference on Caselines is 2-41.

(Statement of Heather BRISTOW read in full)

"I am the wife of Alan BRISTOW, a brewery relief manager. For the past two weeks we have been at the Horse and Groom Public House in North Street, Guildford. Since we have been there, we have found out that the evening trade in particular is mainly army personnel. Approximately two thirds army, one third civilian customers. Last Saturday, 5th of October 1974, we opened up about 5.30pm, and our regulars came straight in, about ten or 12 of them. Then there was a steady flow of customers, until about 7.30pm when it became really busy, once the army lads started to arrive. They all seemed in a good humour, although I could tell they were new recruits because they all drank pints, whereas the last lot always drank shorts.

"At about 8.10pm I took my break and I went down to the Surrey Arms in North Street with our barman who is a friend of ours, John CHADWICK. He lives locally, near North Street. We were in there about 30 minutes and then I went back to the Horse and Groom on my own. I left John at the Surrey Arms.

“I walked back quite fast, because I don’t like being out on my own. I had a job to get back in because it was crowded, especially near the entrance. When I did get back in and behind the bar, I first said to my husband, “It’s your turn now,” and he left the pub. I started to serve customers. The first one I served wanted Pernod. I had none on the shelf, so I went down to the cellar to get some. To do this, I had to go through the bar area. I did not notice anything unusual at this time. At the time I returned from the cellar, went back behind the bar and started to pour out the Pernod. Then I heard a loud ‘boom’, followed by a lot of screaming and shouting. The lights went out and debris started falling about me. I had been thrown forward and out of my shoes. I made my way out through to the backyard, but the door was locked. Some young men I took to be soldiers also came through to the back and eventually the door was broken down from the outside and I was led out.

“I made my way out through to the back yard, but the door was locked. Some young men I took to be soldiers also came through to the back, and eventually the door was broken down from the outside and I was led out.

“Normally, we have about ten or so Irish men using the pub, and on this particular evening I noticed there was about five of these Irish

men in the bar before I went down to the Surrey Arms. When I returned there was only two that I noticed. I remember these two because one of them has been helping us to collect and wash glasses of an evening, and the other one was his mate. The one who helps us with the washing up, I would describe him as being about 5'8, medium build, long sandy coloured hair, just over collar, slightly wavy, blue or grey eyes. He was wearing a dark navy jacket and trousers, which may have been a suit. He had a light coloured shirt with a dark tie. His mate was wearing some old overalls, as he normally does. About 5'8 tall, slim build. His hair was dirty, but could have been dark brown to his collar. He had no front top teeth. His overalls were grey, blue and dirty. He was about 30 years old.

I've never heard of any trouble in the pub between soldiers and civvies. I recall that on the Saturday evening my husband told me that some of the soldiers had recently returned from Northern Ireland. That evening, as I returned from the cellar, after getting the Pernod, my Barmaid, Maureen O'SULLIVAN, told me that she had seen someone with a red coat coming out of the door marked private. I said I would keep an eye on it and did no more." That's signed by Heather BRISTOW on the 9th October 1974.

Turning to the witness statement of Edna LEGG, who was the Cleaner. It is Caselines 5-10, S209 is the case reference, the file reference.

MS KUZMENKO: (Statement of Edna LEGG read in full)

“I live at the above address and work part time as a Cleaner. From November of 1973 until the 5th October 1974, I worked as the Cleaner at the Horse & Groom Public House. I used to work there every day from 9 am until 11 am, except on Sundays when I did not work. I used to clean the floor, the tables, chairs, the toilets and the general bar area. The bench seats in both alcoves were open underneath the seat to the rear walls to a depth of about two feet. When I cleaned underneath them, the walls were an arm’s length away. The whole of the area was carpeted, including the area beneath the bench seats, and this extended right up to the walls. The chairs, benches and stools were covered in a dark grey/green PVC material.

“On the day of the explosion I cleaned the bar, finishing it about 10.30 am, and at that time there was nothing underneath the seats. It is impossible to pass any object from the front of the alcove to the second alcove by the fire under the bench seats because the partition goes right up to the wall and blocks the two areas off. There was a small six inch gap between the fireplace and the bench seat, and a gap

of about two feet on the other side, between the juke box and the fireplace.

“Whilst I have been working there during the last four months or so, I have noticed a man who came into the bar regularly four or five times a week at about 10.30 am. He always seemed to be the first customer in. I do not recall seeing him for a period two weeks prior to the explosion. He always seemed to be on his own, and didn’t appear to mix with anyone or want any company. I would describe him as about 5’7 tall, slim build, he had black or dark brown greasy straight hair, which was swept back. It reached down to his collar. He was very pale and had no colour in his face. He had a long thin face. I might describe it as gaunt. He was clean shaven. On most occasions that I saw him he wore a long dark grey or charcoal coloured overcoat, which was calf length. I cannot remember if it had a belt, but the type was one that I would have expected to have had a belt. It had wide lapels. It seemed too large for him. He sometimes wore a collar and tie, but I cannot be sure what he wore beneath the overcoat.” And that’s signed on the 16th October 1974.

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MR SANDERS QC: Sir, for this next statement, just while Ms KUZMENKO is reading that, could I ask Mrs NIN to put up on the screen Caselines reference 3-129?

MS KUZMENKO: We have two statements from Maureen O’SULLIVAN. The first is S256, at it is at Caselines at 2-361. And she is the part time Barmaid.

(Statements of Maureen O’SULLIVAN read in full)

“I am employed two nights a week at the Horse & Groom Public House, North Street, Guildford as a Barmaid. I commenced work at the Horse & Groom at 7.30 pm on Saturday, 5th October 1974. It was quiet at first, but became very busy at about 8.15 pm. A large number of our customers were soldiers.

“At about 8.40 pm, I saw a young man come out of the living quarters of the Licensee. I didn’t take a lot of notice, thinking he must have been a friend. He walked right across the bar and joined about four other people at the door end of the bar. I would describe this man as about 18 years, fair hair cut short, Army style, about 5’2, slim build, wearing a red coloured jacket. I don’t think he was carrying anything.

I did not take any notice of the other persons, but I believe they were all men. I don’t think they were soldiers.

“At about 8.50 pm, I saw a flash which appeared to be in the centre of the bar room, and a large explosion which deafened me. There was a general panic and people ran out of the bar. I ran out also. I then went to the Royal Surrey Hospital with the Landlady, and I was then taken by ambulance to the Cambridge Military Hospital. I received a

slight cut to my left ankle and I think shock. I didn't notice anything in the centre of the bar prior to the explosion." And that's signed 5th October 1974.

We then have the addendum statement S256A, which starts at 2-363 of Caselines.

"I am employed as a part time Barmaid at the Horse & Groom Public House, North Street, Guildford, and I have worked there for the last four months. That is from June 1974. I work there on two nights a week, on Thursday nights from 7.30 pm until closing time, and on Saturday nights from 7.30 pm until closing time.

"Having worked at the Horse & Groom Public House for four months, I know the layout and the fixtures and fittings very well, and I would describe the premises as follows. On entering the front door from North Street and turning right, there is a solid wooden partition, about five feet from the door. The partition has a metal fencing on the top, and the whole partition is about five foot in height. Between the front door and the partition there was a fruit machine. From the partition along the front wall towards the corner, where the gents' toilets were situated, there were three square tables. Around each table there were four stools. Opposite these square tables, near the food preparation room, there was a round table with two stools. Next to this table, and

the direction of the front door, the bar flap was situated. Around the corner of the bar, walking away from the bar flap in the direction of the ladies' toilets, there is a pillar about five feet in front of the bar. It is a square pillar and it goes from the floor to the roof. It was made of a brick and wooden structure.

“Along the bar, between the pillar and the back wall, there were four bar stools. Between the end of the bar and the back wall there was a sink. About seven foot along the back wall from the bar there is a stairway. The stairway juts out from the back wall about seven foot. Along the back wall and the stairway wall there was a narrow bench about one foot wide. Next to the stairway there was a door to the ladies' toilets. Next to the ladies' toilets there is an alcove. On looking into the alcove from the bar, on the right hand side the juke box was situated, and next to the juke box there was a fireplace. From the fireplace to the side wall was a the distance of about five feet and there was a fixed bench seat along the wall. The bench seat also extended along the side wall for a distance of about eight feet to a solid wooden partition. The wooden partition extended into the bar about 12 feet. The wooden partition was solid and was about four foot in height, and I cannot remember whether there was anything on top of the wood or not.

“The bench seat I mentioned earlier also extended out into the bar along the partitions. The bench seats I have mentioned in the alcove were covered with a plastic material, and there was a space of about a foot and a half between the bench seats and the floor. This space was not covered, so it was possible to leave glasses or anything under the bench seats. In this alcove there were also four round tables, and at each of these tables there were three stools. Between the end of the partition and the bar there was a round table with two stools. Along the side wall, between the partition and the front wall, there is a bench seat. This bench seat was also covered with a plastic material, and all the bench seats that I have mentioned were coloured green.

In front of the bench seat, between the partition and the front wall, there were two round tables, and at these tables there were two stools at each. Between the side wall and the end of the partition there are around two round tables. Under each table there were four stools. Along the front wall, about eight feet from the side wall, there was a wooden partition with metal fencing on the top. The partition with the solid wood and metal fencing was about five foot in height and extended out about five foot. Behind this partition, looking from the bar, there was a round table with three stools. Between this partition end and the front door, there was a round table with four stools. This

table was situated just under the front window. The switches controlling the lights in the bar were situated on a wall behind the bar, and the lights in the bar were always constant.

“With regard to the man mentioned in my first statement, whom I saw coming out of the living quarters of the Licensee of the Horse & Groom, I can now add further information. I have today been shown by both DI BRIGGS and DC PIRIE a series of photographs from which I have been able to identify a number of customers who were in the Horse & Groom prior to the explosion. I have indicated on a plan of the public house a series of locations appertaining to where these people stood in the pub within half an hour of the bomb exploding. I have numbered each of these locations from number one to 13, and have attached to that plan a list recording the photographs identified.

I myself was behind the bar from the time I started, apart from one occasion when I collected empty glasses from the bar. When the explosion occurred, I was facing the optics. I remember a blue flash, but cannot recall hearing any actual bang. I realised something was wrong and my immediate thought was to get out. I ran along the bar, through the flap and straight to the front door to get outside as quickly as I could. On my way, I saw a blaze very low on the floor at a

position midway between the wooden support pillar and the centre of the alcove.” And that was signed on the 15th October 1974.

CORONER: **Mr SANDERS, I think that concludes the evidence, doesn't it?**

MR SANDERS QC: That's correct, sir. That's all for today.

CORONER: **Okay. Well, we will leave it there for today. We will start again, please, and we have got tomorrow morning. I think we start with three live witnesses?**

MR SANDERS QC: Yes.

MR BERRY: Sir, may I just say that as the evidence and the issues have developed in the case, the Metropolitan Police Service's interest has become quite a minor one. And in the interests of saving public funds, it is not my client's intention that I, or my Instructing Solicitors, should attend every day. That will include tomorrow. But I wanted to let you know, and if any of the families weren't here, they know that there is no disrespect intended to the process. We continue to participate in any way that ...

CORONER: **I understand that.**

MR BERRY: ... you ask.

CORONER: **I understand entirely. Thank you.**

MR BERRY: Thank you, sir.

CORONER: And no offence was taken. Yes, (inaudible) tomorrow morning at
10 o'clock. Thank you.

CLERK: Court please rise.

(Court adjourned until 10 am, Wednesday 22nd June 2022)